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EXTRADITION AS A TOOL FOR UNITED
STATES ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT:
IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.K. DECISION

NORRIS v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE
HOME DEPARTMENT
INTRODUCTION

F

oreign executives who violate U.S. business laws can no longer
seek refuge behind their own borders to avoid the U.S. criminal
justice system.1 In 2005, for the first time, the United States convinced a
foreign court to order the extradition of a foreign national indicted on a
U.S. antitrust charge.2 Although extradition treaties are typically negotiated to aid law enforcement in prosecution of transnational crimes like
terrorism and drug trafficking, extradition is increasingly being used to
pursue white-collar criminals between the United States and the United
Kingdom.3 The availability of extradition for a price fixing offense has
the potential to expand the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws
and policies, and may have significant implications for international antitrust enforcement.
In Norris v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,4 the Queen’s
Bench Administrative Court of England (the “Court”)5 upheld an order
1. See Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. for Criminal Enforcement,
Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Speech at the Twentieth Annual National Institute
on White Collar Crime: Charting New Waters in International Cartel Prosecutions 2
(Mar. 2, 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/214861.htm [hereinafter
Hammond Speech]; Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, Crossing the Border: U.S. Antitrust Agencies Take Action Globally, N.Y.L.J., Vol. 236, July 18, 2006.
2. See Hammond Speech, supra note 1, at 2.
3. See Joanne O’Connor, Retired City Exec Fights Extradition to US as Lopsided
Treaty Comes Into Play, THE LAWYER, May 9, 2005 (“[S]ince the Extradition Act’s inception, the US has filed 43 applications for extradition. And more than half of these—
22—are for white-collar offences.”).
4. The Queen on the Application of Ian Norris v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t,
[2006] EWHC 280 (Q.B. Admin). The Bow Street Magistrates’ Court presided over Norris’s initial extradition hearing, and held that price fixing and obstruction of justice
charges were extraditable offenses under the Extradition Act 2003. Id. para. 1. The Magistrates’ Court is the United Kingdom’s lowest level tribunal. See Her Majesty’s Court
Service, The Court Structure of Her Majesty’s Court Service, http://www.hmcourtsservice.gov.uk/aboutus/structure/index.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2007).
5. The Queen’s Bench Administrative Court is the High Court of the United Kingdom that hears appeals from extradition decisions of the Magistrates’ Court. See Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, §§ 103, 108 (U.K.). Further appeals are made to the House of
Lords, the highest court of the United Kingdom, upon certification by the High Court.
See Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, § 114; see also House of Lords Briefing,
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made under the Extradition Act 20036 to extradite Ian P. Norris7 to the
United States to face price fixing and obstruction of justice charges.8 As
a result, Norris, the former CEO of the British corporation Morgan Crucible Company (“Morgan”), was confronted with extradition to the
United States to face a 2003 indictment from the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania for charges related to his involvement in an international
cartel9 in the carbon products market.10 This ruling is a significant development in international antitrust enforcement,11 particularly because the
U.S. Department of Justice has placed high priority on the aggressive
pursuit of international cartels.12
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/HofLBpJudicial.pdf (last visited Nov. 9,
2007) (providing an overview of the House of Lords’ judicial functions). The Bow Street
Magistrates’ Court presided over Norris’s extradition hearing, and held that price fixing
and obstruction of justice charges were extraditable offenses under the Extradition Act
2003.
6. Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41 (U.K.).
7. Norris is a citizen of the United Kingdom. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 1.
8. Id. para. 17. See also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION UPDATE, Spring
2006, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/216254.pdf (discussing the Norris case and the
Division’s use of extraditing foreign nationals in its year review of cartel enforcement).
9. J. Anthony Chavez, The Carrot and the Stick Approach to Antitrust Enforcement,
at 537–38 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 8736, 2006).
The term cartel is increasingly used in countries with competition laws
throughout the world to refer to a pattern of collusive behavior by competing
firms that typically involves the following: participating in meetings and conversations to discuss prices and volumes; agreeing to fix, increase, and maintain prices at certain levels; agreeing to allocate among the corporate conspirators the approximate volume to be sold by them; exchanging sales and customer information for the purpose of monitoring and enforcing adherence to the
above-described agreements; issuing price announcements and price quotations
in accordance with the above-described agreements; and/or selling at the
agreed-upon sales volume allocations.
Id. A hard core cartel is a clear agreement among competitors to control the market, most
commonly in the form of price fixing. Contrast a hard core cartel with a cartel characterized by ambiguous conduct that could potentially serve the market. See ELEANOR M. FOX,
ET AL., U.S. ANTITRUST IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 78 (2d ed. 2004).
10. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 1.
11. See Julian M. Joshua, Extradition: The DOJ’s New Foreign Policy Weapon,
COMPETITION LAW INSIGHT, June, 14, 2005, at 12.
12. Recently, the United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division has focused
on bringing criminal enforcement proceedings against international cartels that affect
U.S. commerce. See MARK R. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER, A GUIDE
TO THE OPERATION OF UNITED STATES, EUROPEAN UNION AND OTHER KEY COMPETITION
LAWS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 131 (2006); Hammond Speech, supra note 1, at 1–2.
Current Department of Justice efforts emphasize individual accountability and “vigorous
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This development concerns the U.K. business community.13 It also
concerns Parliament that the United Kingdom’s current extradition legislation gives the United States great freedom to extradite U.K. citizens,
but no reciprocal arrangement exists to protect U.K. interests or to grant
such latitude to the United Kingdom when seeking extradition from the
United States.14 If the House of Lords, which has granted Norris leave to
appeal, upholds the ruling that Norris should be extradited to the United
States to face criminal antitrust charges, the United States will undoubtedly continue to pursue extradition to enforce its antitrust laws in the
United Kingdom. This will certainly alter the landscape of international
antitrust enforcement. If other countries follow the United Kingdom’s
lead, the United States will have the opportunity to impose American
antitrust ideals across the globe. This Note argues that the High Court
should have reversed the lower court’s ruling in Norris because the statutory requirement of dual criminality was not satisfied. It will also consider the impact on global antitrust enforcement if the Norris decision is
ultimately upheld by the House of Lords, and propose that the United
States should not use extradition to broaden the reach of its antitrust law
and policy.
Part I of this Note outlines the framework of U.S.-U.K. extradition law
between the United States and the United Kingdom. Part II discusses the
developments that gave rise to the Norris case, including the U.S. indictment and the U.K. extradition decision. Part III discusses the significance of international antitrust enforcement, compares cartel and extraterritorial jurisdiction policy in the United States and the United Kingdom, and considers arguments for and against extraditing antitrust violators. In conclusion, this Note explains why the Norris case was decided
prosecution of foreign nationals who violate U.S. antitrust laws.” Id. The Department of
Justice has several resources at its disposal for international cartel investigations—
improved assistance and coordination with foreign authorities, border watches, Interpol
Red Notices, and extradition requests. Id. at 7–12.
13. See Joanne Harris, Analysis: Fair Trade?, THE LAWYER, Apr. 17, 2006 (“[T]here
is a rising tide of anger in the UK over the way that the Government handles extradition
requests from the US and the fact that laws designed to combat terrorism are being used
against businesses.”).
14. See, e.g., 673 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) (2006) 402 (“Mr. Norris’s case is a good
example of the U.S. government using the simplified extradition regime in the U.K. to
extradite a U.K. citizen in circumstances that appear wholly unsatisfactory. The original
price fixing charge would not stand up in English courts, due to the fact that this was
made an offense in the U.K. only with the passage of the Enterprise Act 2002 and the
allegations relate to the 1990s . . . . [N]ot only is the basis of the charges questionable, but
the majority of the conduct complained of occurred in the U.K. and Europe and not in the
U.S.”).
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incorrectly and argues that the United States should limit its pursuit of
extradition of foreign antitrust offenders as a matter of policy.
I. EXTRADITION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM
The United States and the United Kingdom have a long history of extradition relations that dates back to 1794.15 Until recently, extradition
procedure between the two countries was governed by the 1989 Extradition Act (“1989 Act”) in conjunction with the U.K.-U.S. Treaty of 1972
and a 1985 supplemental treaty (collectively, the “1972 Treaty”).16 In
2003, the United States and the United Kingdom signed a new Treaty on
Extradition (“2003 Treaty”)17 to simplify the existing regime and accelerate extradition between the two countries.18 After more than two years,
the 2003 Treaty was ratified by the United States Senate on September
29, 2006.19 Still, an imbalance exists because the evidentiary requirements for each country are not parallel.
Before the United States ratified the 2003 Treaty, the United Kingdom
passed the Extradition Act 2003 (“2003 Act”), which repealed the 1989
Act.20 The 2003 Act essentially implemented the terms of the 2003
Treaty by including the United States as one of the countries to which it
will extradite.21 The 1972 Treaty was still in force even after the 2003
Act took effect, which complicated the extradition landscape between the
United States and the United Kingdom.22 The evidentiary requirements

15. The first extradition treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom
was the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, also known as Jay’s Treaty. See
Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1974, 8 Stat. 116;
see also Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 20 (discussing the history of extradition between the United States and the United Kingdom).
16. See Robert M. Osgood & Nathan J. Dunleavy, U.K.-U.S. Extradition for Antitrust
Offenses, 2006 N.Y. ST. B.A. INT’L L. PRACTICUM 35, 35 (Spring 2006).
17. Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.S.-U.K., March 31, 2003, S.TREATY DOC.
NO. 108-23 (2004) [hereinafter Extradition Treaty].
18. See Joshua, supra note 11, at 12; Roger Smith, Rights & Wrongs: Going Over
There, LAW SOCIETY GAZETTE, June 16, 2005. Another objective of the 2003 Treaty was
to update the bilateral relationship between the United States and United Kingdom to
align its terms with the U.S.-EU Treaty, Agreement on Extradition, June 25, 2003, U.S.EU, 2003 O.J. (L 181) 27. See Sean D. Murphy, New U.S./EU and U.S./U.K. Extradition
Treaties, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 848, 849 (2004).
19. See 152 CONG. REC. S1067 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006).
20. See Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, sched. 4.
21. See 667 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) 712.
22. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 21.
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of the 1972 Treaty were greater than those of the 2003 Act.23 However,
U.S. ratification of the 2003 Treaty has brought the bilateral agreement
into conformity with the U.K legislation.24
The 2003 Act created new extradition procedures for all of the United
Kingdom’s extradition partners, including the United States.25 Like the
2003 Treaty, the 2003 Act created a more flexible regime for extradition
in response to the September 11, 2001 terror attacks in the United
States.26 A significant, and controversial, element of the 2003 Act is Order 2003 (S.I. 2003/3334).27 The Order specially designates the United
States as a territory for purposes of certain sections of the 2003 Act,28
which effectively exempts the United States from the Act’s requirement
to provide prima facie evidence in support of an extradition request.29 As
a result of this special designation, the United States is merely required

23. Article IX of the 1972 Treaty provides that “[e]xtradition shall be granted only if
the evidence be found sufficient according to the law of the requested Party either to
justify the committal for trial of the person sought if the offense of which he is accused
had been committed in the territory of the requested Party or to prove that he is the identical person convicted by the courts of the requesting Party.” Treaty on Extradition between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.S.-U.K., Oct. 21, 1976, 28 U.S.T. 227,
available at 2003 WL 23527406. This issue is central to Norris’s argument in Norris. See
infra Part III.C.1.
24. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 35 (“If the 2003 Treaty is ratified by the
United States, the inconsistency between the designation and the express terms of the
extant Treaty would disappear and citizens of the United Kingdom would cease to have
any enforceable right based on it.”).
25. The Extradition Act 2003 is organized into two parts, Part 1 applying to Category
1 territories, and Part 2 applying to Category 2 territories. See JULIAN B. KNOWLES,
BLACKSTONE’S GUIDE TO THE EXTRADITION ACT 2003 4 (2004). Category 1 territories are
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. See Extradition, 2003,
S.I. 2003/3333, art. 2, para. 2. Part 1 introduces new extradition procedures, including a
statutory appeal process and reduced involvement of the Secretary of State. Id. A country
may not be a Category 1 territory if it has the death penalty for criminal offenses. See
Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, § 1(3). Additionally, Part 1 of the 2003 Act implements the
European Arrest Warrant. See KNOWLES at 6. The United States is one of over 100 Category 2 territories. See SI 2003/3334, art. 2.
26. See Joshua, supra note 11, at 12; Harris, supra note 13. In addition, the United
Kingdom was motivated to revise its extradition legislation after Spain’s attempt in
1998–2000 to extradite General Augusto Pinochet from the United Kingdom for crimes
against humanity. See KNOWLES, supra note 25, at 3–4.
27. See Extradition, 2003, S.I. 2003/3334.
28. Statutory Instrument 2003/3334 paragraph 3 designates Category 2 territories for
purposes of section 71(4), 73(5), 84(7), and 86(7) of the Act. Id.
29. Id. at Explanatory Note.
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to provide “information,”30 a low standard that facilitates a relatively
simple and speedy United States extradition request from the United
Kingdom.31 However, even with ratification of the 2003 Treaty, the
United Kingdom is not afforded the same luxury when requesting extradition from the United States.32
A critical reform of the 2003 Treaty was adoption of a dual criminality
requirement, where an offense is extraditable only if the conduct is
criminalized in both systems.33 The reform replaced the “list” system, in
which extraditable offenses were enumerated.34 The 2003 Act also
adopted a dual criminality requirement, requiring that the conduct for
which extradition is requested is punishable with imprisonment for one
year or greater in both the United Kingdom and the Category 2 territory.35 Modern extradition treaties often adopt a dual criminality requirement to determine whether an act is an extraditable offense,36 so this
reform is not extraordinary in comparison to other extradition treaties.
However, the broader definition of what constitutes an “extraditable offense” under the new regime complicated the Norris extradition.
A. Defining “Extradition Offense” Under the 2003 Act
The 2003 Act defines “extradition offense” differently for two contexts, one for persons not sentenced for the offense, and the other for persons so sentenced.37 The defendant’s “conduct” is the essential concept

30. See Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, § 71 (requiring “information” rather than “evidence”).
31. See Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, § 84(7) (permitting the Secretary of State to
exempt a territory from the need for prima facie evidence requirement of section 84(1)).
32. The United Kingdom must show “probable cause” in U.S. extradition requests.
See Extradition Treaty, S.TREATY DOC. NO. 108-23, art. 8. In Norris, a central argument
is that the evidentiary terms of the 1972 Treaty directly conflict with the evidentiary
terms of the 2003 Act. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 34. The Court rejected this
argument. See infra p. 15.
33. See Joshua, supra note 11, at 12.
34. Id.
35. See supra note 25 for Category 2 territory definition; Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41,
§§ 137–138; KNOWLES, supra note 25, at 12, 22.
36. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW
AND PRACTICE 466–67, 481 (Oceana Publications) (4th ed. 2002).
37. See Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, §§ 137–138; KNOWLES, supra note 25, at 18.
Norris was not sentenced, thus the applicable definition of “extradition offense” can be
found in section 137. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 2. This Note will address
extradition between the United States, a Category 2 territory, and the United Kingdom
under the 2003 Act. The definition of “extradition offense” for Category 1 territories may
be found in part 1, sections 64–65 of the 2003 Act.
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in section 137 of the 2003 Act.38 Section 137 provides that conduct must
meet a dual criminality requirement.39 Different subsections of section
137 apply depending on where the conduct occurred in relation to the
United Kingdom and the Category 2 territory.40
1. Section 137(2)(a)—Where Did the Conduct Occur?
Section 137(2)(a) requires the conduct to have occurred in the Category 2 territory in order to constitute an extradition offense.41 The High
Court of Justice Queen’s Bench Division (“Queen’s Bench”), in Bermingham & Others v. The Director of the Serious Fraud Office,42 interpreted section 137(2)(a).43 The central issue in Bermingham was whether
section 137(2)(a) is only met if the defendant’s conduct targeted the
Category 2 territory, yet did not exclusively occur there.44 The defendants in Bermingham urged the Queen’s Bench to find that 137(2)(a) was
not met because their conduct caused no harm in the United States, only
in the United Kingdom, and their conduct did not target the United
States.45 The Queen’s Bench rejected this argument, and held that when
the defendants’ conduct took place outside the Category 2 territory and
when the harmful effects were felt there, it qualifies as conduct that occurred in the Category 2 territory and therefore meets the requirements of
38. See The Queen on the Application of Bermingham & Others v. The Director of
the Serious Fraud Office [2006] EWHC 200, para. 81 (“The critical concept in s.137 is
the defendant’s ‘conduct.’ ”).
39. See Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, § 137.
40. See id.; KNOWLES, supra note 25, at 18. Section 137(2) applies when the conduct
occurs in the Category 2 territory. Section 137(3) applies when the conduct occurs outside the Category 2 territory. Section 137(4) applies when the conduct occurs outside the
Category 2 territory and no part of it occurs in the United Kingdom. This section will
discuss section 137(2) because that is the relevant subsection for the Norris case.
41. See Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, § 137(2)(a) (“The conduct constitutes an extradition offense in relation to the category 2 territory if these conditions are satisfied—(a) the
conduct occurs in the category 2 territory . . . .”).
42. In Bermingham, the United States sought extradition of three British executives
for fraud related to the affairs of Enron Corporation. See Bermingham, [2006] EWHC
200, para. 20. The executives were employed in London by the bank Greenwich
NatWest, and they are each citizens and residents of the United Kingdom. Id. The executives challenged the extradition order from Bow Street, arguing that if they were to be
tried at all it should be in England. Id. para. 57. The executives reasoned that the conduct
that gave rise to the charge in the United States prosecutors’ case occurred in the United
Kingdom, and the victim of the alleged fraud was a U.K. institution, thus the requirements of section 137(2) were not met. Id. para. 83.
43. Id. para. 84.
44. Id. para. 83.
45. Id.
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section 137(2)(a).46 Thus, the Queen’s Bench held that 137(2)(a) was
satisfied because the defendants’ “alleged conduct substantially took
place . . . in the United States, as well as in the United Kingdom.”47
2. Section 137(2)(b)—Is Dual Criminality Met?
Section 137(2)(b) introduces the dual criminality requirement of an extradition offense.48 Dual criminality is an essential principle, one that the
House of Lords has said “lies at the heart of [the United Kingdom’s] law
of extradition.”49 Dual criminality may be satisfied even when the conduct complained of in the requesting territory does not have a “precise
equivalent” offense in the United Kingdom.50 The judge at the extradition hearing is not required to find a matching offense, but is required to
consider the conduct that instigated the foreign charge and determine
whether that conduct would constitute an offense in the United Kingdom,
had it occurred there.51
B. The U.S.-U.K. Extradition Regime—Political Reaction and Legislative
Response
The U.S. delay in ratification of the 2003 Treaty became a significant
political issue in the United Kingdom.52 The primary objection to the

46. See Bermingham, [2006] EWHC 200, para. 84.
47. Id. para. 86.
48. See Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, § 137(2)(b) (“The conduct constitutes an extradition offense in relation to the category 2 territory if these conditions are satisfied…(b) the
conduct would constitute an offense under the law of the relevant part of the United
Kingdom punishable with imprisonment or another form of detention for a term of 12
months or a greater punishment if it occurred in that part of the United Kingdom.”). The
“relevant part of the United Kingdom” is defined in section 137(8)(a) as “the part of the
United Kingdom in which the extradition hearing took place, if the question of whether
conduct constitutes an extradition offense is to be decided by the Secretary of State.” See
Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, § 137(8).
49. In Re Al-Fawwaz, [2001] UKHL 69, para. 94.
50. See Howard Welsh, Lee Hope Thrasher v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t,
[2006] EWHC 156 (Admin.), para. 24 (finding that dual criminality was satisfied when
“the conduct which constitutes the US offense of mail fraud in relation to forged instruments would constitute the offense of forgery in England”).
51. Unpublished decision by District Judge Nicholas Evans, Gov’t of the United
States of America v. Ian P. Norris, June 1, 2005 [hereinafter Magistrates’ Court Decision]
(on file with author).
52. See, e.g., 673 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) (2006) 399; 667 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th
ser.) (2004) 711. The Norris case, as well as several other recent U.S.-U.K. extraditions
for white collar criminals, have garnered substantial media attention in the U.K, particularly about the 2003 Treaty. See, e.g., Nikki Tait, Norris Cartel Appeal Begins, FIN.
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2003 Treaty was the lack of reciprocity, that is, that the evidentiary standards were unbalanced.53 A particular area of concern was that the U.K.
government essentially waived its citizens’ rights with the 2003 Act and
potentially subjected them to “oppressive legal action” from foreign
powers.54 One commentator even urged that the United Kingdom
“should tear up [its] signature” before the “one-sided treaty” was ratified
by the United States.55 Additionally, U.K. citizens were skeptical of the
2003 Treaty because it was negotiated and signed in secret, so there was
no opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny.56 Many voiced concerns that
U.S. officials are unpredictable and, absent a requirement to provide evidence, will embark on “fishing expeditions.”57
Soon after the 2003 Act took effect, its critics urged Parliament to terminate the 2003 Treaty,58 requested a new Order revoking the United
States’ special designation, and proposed amendment of Part 2 of the
2003 Act to permit refusal of extradition where the alleged offense was
committed wholly or mainly in the United Kingdom.59 Most recently, the
House of Commons included 2003 Act amendments in proposed legislation.60 As the bill progressed through Parliament, the House of Lords
TIMES UK, Oct. 18, 2006; Michael Binyon, One-Sided Treaty Was Meant to Handle Terrorist Suspects, LONDON TIMES, June 28, 2006.
53. See 673 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) (2006) 404 (Lord Goodhart of the House of
Lords stated that “[t]he 2003 treaty is unfair because it is not reciprocal”); Smith, supra
note 18; Eoin O’Shea, U.K. Businesses Need to Beware the Long Arm of U.S. Law, THE
LAWYER, August 14, 2006 (“[T]he effect in law is that Britons are uniquely vulnerable to
extradition to the U.S., where they are likely to face lengthy delays before trial, high and
irrecoverable costs, much higher sentences and an unfamiliar legal playing field.”). In
addition to the lack of reciprocity, Lord Goodhart set forth four reasons why the United
Kingdom should not agree to extradition to the United States without evidence: (i) the
variable standard of justice in the United States, i.e. fifty-one different jurisdictions with
standards ranging from “good” to “very bad;” (ii) lack of adequate legal aid in the United
States for those who can not afford a lawyer; (iii) excessive plea bargaining in the United
States; and (iv) increasing use of extraterritorial criminal legislation by the United States,
especially in fraud cases. See 667 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) 713.
54. See 673 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) (2006) 403.
55. Smith, supra note 18.
56. See 667 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) 711; Joshua, supra note 11, at 12;
O’Connor, supra note 3.
57. Smith, supra note 18.
58. Either state may terminate the treaty at any time pursuant to Article 24 of the
2003 Treaty, and termination becomes effective six months after receipt of notice. See
Extradition Treaty, S.TREATY DOC. NO. 108-23, art. 24.
59. See 667 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) 714.
60. The House of Commons introduced the Police and Justice Bill on January 25,
2006. The bill primarily contains police reform measures, and also includes miscellaneous items such as amendments to the Extradition Act 2003. See Police and Justice Bill,
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voted to remove the United States as a designated Category 2 territory.61
The House of Commons disagreed with the Lords’ proposed amendment,62 and the resulting legislation did not include such a provision.63
The political melee in the United Kingdom surrounding the 2003
Treaty and the 2003 Act applied pressure on the United States to ratify
the treaty.64 The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (“Committee”), the group charged with reviewing treaties negotiated by the executive branch, met in July 2006 to hear testimony on the 2003 Treaty.65 At
that hearing, Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, urged the
Committee to approve the 2003 Treaty because of its law enforcement
benefits.66 He highlighted the advantage of exemption from showing
prima facie evidence in extradition requests.67 Additionally, McNulty
cautioned the Committee that failure to approve the Treaty would have
2006, H.C. Bill [119] (U.K.) (originally introduced as H.C. Bill [119] on Jan. 25, 2006,
upon first reading in House of Lords became H.L. Bill [104] on May 6, 2006, upon consideration it became H.C. Bill [230]). When major alterations are made to a U.K. bill, the
complete text is reprinted and given a completely new number. The bill is again reprinted
with a new number when passed to the other House for approval. JEAN DANE & PHILIP A.
THOMAS, HOW TO USE A LAW LIBRARY 74 (2d ed. 1987). The complete chronology of the
Police and Justice Bill is available at Lawtel UK.
61. See Lords Amendments to the Police and Justice Bill, H.C. Bill [230] (Oct. 19,
2006) (The House of Lords suggested that the following new clause be inserted:
“[d]esignation of Part 2 territories: omission of United States of America. In the list of
territories in paragraph 3(2) of the Extradition Act 2003 (Designation of Part 2 Territories) Order 2003 (S.I. 2003/3334) ‘the United States of America’ is omitted.”).
62. See Commons Amendments to Lords Amendments, H.C. Bill [230] (Oct. 25,
2006).
63. See Police and Justice Act, 2006, c. 48, sched. 13.
64. See Hearing on the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Committee Hearing] (statement of
Samuel L. Witten) (“[O]ur delay in ratification has become a major political issue in the
United Kingdom. The issue is being seen by the British media and public as a question of
good faith on the part of the United States. Inaction on our part . . . is undermining British
public opinion that we are a reliable ally.”); Tim Reid, Senate is Warned of Discontent
Here, TIMES UK, July 22, 2006.
65. See Committee Hearing, supra note 64 (statement of Sen. Richard Lugar). The
Committee suggested several reasons as to why it had yet to approve the 2003 Treaty.
There was concern that (i) the 2003 Treaty does not guarantee U.S. citizens their constitutional rights if tried in the United Kingdom, (ii) it potentially violates the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and (iii) it permits waiver of the Rule of Specialty, which ensures that a fugitive surrendered for one offense is not tried for other
crimes. Id. In addition, the Irish-American lobby objected to ratification because they felt
the 2003 Treaty would make it easier to prosecute IRA suspects and sympathizers living
in the United States. Id.
66. Id. (statement of Paul J. McNulty).
67. Id.
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serious negative consequences, emphasizing the United States’ relationship with the United Kingdom and pressure there on Parliament to correct the imbalanced extradition relationship.68 Following this Committee
hearing in July 2006, the Senate ratified the treaty on September 29,
2006.69
II. THE NORRIS EXTRADITION
The Norris decision was one of the catalysts that brought discussion of
the unbalanced evidentiary standards of the 2003 Act to the forefront of
discussion in the United Kingdom, both in the legal community and
among the citizenry.70 This case lies at the intersection of extradition and
antitrust law, and marks a significant step towards expanding the reach of
United States antitrust enforcement globally. The recent change in the
perception of price fixing in the United Kingdom, where it is now regarded as unequivocally criminal, has made extradition available, an
avenue of cooperation only available in the realm of criminal law.71
A. Norris’s U.S. Indictment
In 1999, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
initiated an investigation into U.S. federal antitrust offenses involving
carbon products manufactured and sold by Morgan.72 Morgan was involved in an industry wide price fixing conspiracy to coordinate prices
for carbon products sold in the United States.73 Norris, a Morgan employee and company officer, allegedly conspired in organizing and operating the cartel.74 Additionally, Norris allegedly interfered with the
United States’ investigation by organizing co-conspirators to provide
false information, preparing a script for cartel participants to follow if
68. See Committee Hearing, supra note 64 (statement of Paul J. McNulty).
69. See 152 CONG. REC. S1067 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006).
70. See Anand Doobay, Extradition and Mutual Assistance—A Changing Landscape,
THE CRIM. LAW., July/Aug. 2006, at 4.
71. Julian Joshua, The European Cartel Enforcement Regime Post-Modernization:
How is it Working?, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1247, 1269 (2006).
72. See United States of America v. Ian P. Norris, Criminal No. 03-632, Indictment, 1
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2003) [hereinafter Norris Indictment].
73. See United States of America v. Ian P. Norris, Criminal No. 03-632, Second Superseding Indictment, 1–2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Norris Second Superseding Indictment]; Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, paras. 5, 11. Three other Morgan executives
were charged with obstruction of justice. Each pled guilty and served prison sentences in
the United States. Subsidiaries Morgan Crucible and Morganite entered into a plea
agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice. Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, paras. 11, 15.
74. See Norris Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 73, at 3; Norris, [2006]
EWHC 280, para. 5.
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questioned by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice or the
federal grand jury, and destroying business files containing evidence of
the anticompetitive agreement.75
Morgan is headquartered in Windsor, England76 and has two United
States subsidiaries.77 Norris was Chairman of the Carbon Division of
Morgan from 1986 through 1998.78 Subsequently, Norris was Morgan’s
CEO from 1998 through 2002.79 While Norris was a Morgan employee,
the company was a major global manufacturer of carbon and maintained
a dominant market share in the United States.80
Norris was indicted in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in September 2003 for obstruction of justice and conspiracy charges.81 A superseding indictment was filed in October 2003, which added price fixing conspiracy charges.82 In September 2004, a second superseding indictment
was filed which made reference to sentencing guidelines.83
B. Norris’s U.K. Extradition
English authorities issued an arrest warrant for Norris at the request of
the U.S. Department of Justice on December 31, 2004, and Norris was
arrested on January 13, 2005.84 The Bow Street Magistrates’ Court held
the extradition hearing on May 10–12, 2005,85 at which the District
75. Norris Indictment, supra note 72, at 3.
76. Id. at 1.
77. Morganite, Inc. is a subsidiary located in North Carolina, and Morgan Advanced
Materials and Technology, Inc. is located in St. Mary’s, Pennsylvania. See Norris, [2006]
EWHC 280, para. 5.
78. See Norris Indictment, supra note 72, at 1.
79. Id.
80. Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 5.
81. See Norris Indictment, supra note 72. The specific charges include: (i) violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 37, conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud United States, (ii) violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1), knowingly . . . corruptly persuades another person . . . with
intent to influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding, and (iii) violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(B), to cause or induce any person to
alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal and object with intent to impair the object’s integrity
or availability for use in an official proceeding.
82. See United States of America v. Ian P. Norris, Criminal No. 03-632, Superseding
Indictment (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2003). The additional charge was violation of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (“every contract . . . in restraint of trade or commerce . . . with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal.”).
83. See Norris Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 73.
84. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 16.
85. See Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, § 139(1)(a) (“The appropriate judge is, in England and Wales, a District Judge (Magistrates’ Court) designated for the purposes of this
Part by the Lord Chancellor . . . .”).
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Judge concluded that no factors existed to properly bar Norris’s extradition to the United States.86 The case was sent to the Secretary of State of
the Home Department (“Secretary of State”) for a final extradition decision,87 and on September 29, 2005, he ordered Norris’s extradition.88
Norris appealed the decisions of the District Judge and Secretary of
State, but failed to persuade the Queen’s Bench Administrative Court89 to
overturn the order for his extradition.90 In January 2007, the High Court
of the Queen’s Bench Division rejected Norris’s appeal.91 The House of
Lords, the highest court in the United Kingdom, has granted Norris leave
to appeal.92
C. The Appeal—Norris v. Secretary of State for the Home Department
Norris appealed the Secretary of State’s extradition order under section
108 of the 2003 Act.93 The appeal encompassed two parts: (i) application
for judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision to refuse Norris’s
request for removal of the United States as a designated territory94 and
86. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 16.
87. See Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, § 70(1) (“The Secretary of State must issue a
certificate under this section if he receives a valid request for the extradition to a category
2 territory of a person who is in the United Kingdom.”).
88. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 17. The Secretary of State makes the extradition decision based on the judge’s decision from the extradition hearing. See Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, §§ 70(1), 87(3), 93(4).
89. The Administrative Court is a division of the High Court Queen’s Bench that
exercises supervisory jurisdiction over inferior courts and tribunals. See Her Majesty’s
Court Service, http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/cms/admin.htm (last visited Nov. 2,
2006).
90. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 52.
91. Norris v. United States of America, [2007] EWHC 71 (Admin); see also Nikki
Tait, High Court Upholds Norris Extradition, FIN. TIMES UK, Jan. 25, 2007 (“Two High
Court judges dismissed arguments that the price-fixing charges of which Mr. Norris is
accused were not a criminal offence in the UK at the time and could not be an ‘extradition offence’.”).
92. Nina Goswami, Norris Extradition Saga Goes to the Lords, THE LAWYER, June 7,
2007.
93. Section 108 provides: “If the Secretary of State orders a person’s extradition under this Part, the person may appeal to the High Court against the order.” Extradition Act,
2003, c. 41, § 108(1). The Extradition Act 2003 created a statutory right to appeal to the
High Court and provides for a right of appeal to the House of Lords. The Act creates
separate rights of appeal against decisions of the judge and against an extradition order
made by the Secretary of State. See Bermingham, [2006] EWHC 200, para. 11. This
process replaced the traditional process where an extradition defendant appealed by way
of an application for a writ of habeas corpus as subjicientdum. See KNOWLES, supra note
25, at 121–22.
94. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 1.
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(ii) statutory appeals regarding whether the offenses specified in the extradition request were “extradition offenses” under section 137 of the
2003 Act and whether any bars to extradition under the 2003 Act existed.95 The Court issued an opinion on the judicial review issue, and
postponed consideration of the statutory appeals as the issue was pending
in the Bermingham case.96
1. Should the United States Remain a Designated Category 2 Territory?
Norris argued that the United States should be removed from the list of
countries designated under the Part 2 Order of the 2003 Act.97 Norris’s
position was that this designation, which exempts the United States from
providing a prima facie case to extradite a U.K. citizen, was illegal and
irrational because the designation under the 2003 Act contradicts the express terms of the 1972 Treaty.98 Additionally, Norris argued that the
Secretary of State’s refusal to remove the United States from this list of
designated territories was also illegal.99 The underlying substance of
Norris’s argument was that the 1972 Treaty provided U.K. citizens with
enforceable rights and protections, and that the Secretary of State’s designation of the United States as a Category 2 territory subject to a lower
evidentiary standard violated those rights.100
Additionally, Norris criticized the 2003 Act because the United Kingdom included the United States as a Category 2 territory based on the
expectation that the 2003 Treaty would soon be ratified.101 Norris argued
that the United Kingdom was misled and the Secretary of State’s Order
was based on a misunderstanding.102 Interestingly, Norris’s argument
echoes the political debate about the 2003 Act, and even implicates the
criticism that there is a lack of reciprocity between the United States and
the United Kingdom in extradition procedure.103

95. Id. para. 2.
96. Id. para. 3.
97. Id. para. 18. The Order is S.I. 2003/3334. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
98. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 35.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. para. 47.
102. Id. para. 47.
103. Id. para. 35. Norris argued that “[n]o sufficient effort has been made in the United
States to seek ratification of the 2003 Treaty. The Government there had been ‘dilatory’,
so that there is no immediate prospect of alleviating . . . a ‘glaring and continuing repugnance’ between the international obligations created by the 1972 Treaty, and the continuing application of s84(7) to the United States. Moreover, there is an imbalance and ‘lack
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The Court rejected Norris’s arguments, noting that the judiciary is not
entitled to oversee the legislative process which led to the Order.104 The
Court focused on the legality of the Secretary of State’s decision to refuse Norris’s request for removal of the United States as a designated
territory, and held that it was a legally sound decision.105 Specifically, the
Court stated that the 2003 Act grants the Secretary of State the power to
make orders, which permitted the United Kingdom to grant other states
greater assistance in the extradition process, and the 2003 Act does not
restrict exercise of that power based on reciprocity.106 The Court noted
that nothing in the 2003 Act suggests that designation is dependent on a
bilateral treaty between the United Kingdom and the requesting country.107 In sum, the Court declined to compel the Secretary of State to remove the Order’s designation to incent the United States to ratify the
2003 Treaty, and refused to impair the Secretary’s powers under the
2003 Act by forcing him to remove the United States.108 Moreover, part
of Norris’s argument is moot now that the 2003 Treaty has been ratified
in the United States.109
2. Is the Specified Offense an “Extradition Offense” Under Section 137?
The Court in Norris did not address whether or not the specified offense for which the United States was seeking Norris’s extradition was
an “extradition offense” under section 137 because the Queen’s Bench
was addressing its interpretation in Bermingham.110 At Norris’s extradition hearing, the Bow Street Magistrates’ Court found that the offenses
specified in the United States’ extradition request did in fact meet the
requirements, and thus were “extradition offenses” as defined in section
137.111 Norris challenged this finding in his appeal.112 In Bermingham,
the Queen’s Bench discussed section 137 and its interpretation did not
favor Norris. The Queen’s Bench holding in Bermingham precludes Norris’s argument that he should be tried in the United Kingdom for conduct
that occurred there. Thus, Norris must rely on the argument that price
of reciprocity’ in arrangements between the two sovereign states, which was never properly addressed.” Id.; see supra Part I.B.
104. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 45.
105. Id. para. 46.
106. Id. para. 45.
107. Id. para. 43.
108. Id. para. 52.
109. Id. para. 35.
110. Id. para. 3.
111. See Magistrates’ Court Decision, para. 8.
112. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 1.
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fixing was not a crime in the United Kingdom when he allegedly participated in the carbon-products cartel, and the dual criminality requirement
of section 137(2)(b) is not satisfied.113
Cartel participation was not a crime in the United Kingdom until enactment of the Enterprise Act 2002.114 The United States charged that
Norris engaged in price fixing from 1986 until 2000.115 During this period, the Competition Act 1998 (“1998 Act”) took effect.116 The 1998
Act prohibited price fixing and market sharing agreements117 and imposed fines for violations,118 but did not impose a criminal penalty. Today, the Enterprise Act 2002 imposes criminal sanctions of up to five
years imprisonment for individual cartel participation.119
The lack of a criminal cartel offense during the time of Norris’s alleged
violations did not impede the U.S. Department of Justice from arguing in
Norris’s extradition request that the dual criminality requirement was
met.120 Before the Enterprise Act 2002, the U.K. common law crime of
conspiracy to defraud served to punish cartel participants where the
agreement involved “dishonestly doing something prejudicial to an-

113. See Harris, supra note 13.
114. See Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40. § 188. See also Julian M. Joshua, The U.K.’s New
Cartel Offence and Its Implication for EC Competition Law: a Tangled Web, EUR. L.
REV. 620, 620 (2003) [hereinafter Joshua, Tangled Web] (“[T]he U.K. government created a new criminal offense in the Enterprise Act 2002.”); Angus MacCulloch, The Cartel Offense and the Criminalisation of United Kingdom Competition Law, J. BUS. L. 616,
616 (2003) (“The introduction of the Cartel Offense in the Enterprise Act 2002 has been
one of the more controversial elements of the U.K.’s recent competition law reforms.”).
115. See Norris Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 73, at 2.
116. Competition Act, 1998, c. 41. The Competition Act 1998 was created to harmonize U.K. competition law with EU competition law. See JOELSON, supra note 12, at 490.
Prior to the 1998 Act, U.K. competition law was predominantly administrative, and “was
perceived by many, although not all, to be toothless and ineffective.” MARK FURSE &
SUSAN NASH, THE CARTEL OFFENCE 3 (2004).
117. See Competition Act, 1998, c. 41, § 2(2); JAMES FLYNN & JEMIMA STRATFORD,
COMPETITION, UNDERSTANDING THE 1998 ACT 42 (1999).
118. See Competition Act, 1998, c. 3, § 36; FLYNN & STRATFORD, supra note 117, at
142.
119. See Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40, § 190 (“(1) A person guilty of an offense under
section 188 is liable- (a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding five years or to a fine, or to both . . . .”). Additionally, the Enterprise Act specifies that the cartel offense is an extraditable offense. Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40, § 191.
120. See Magistrates’ Court Decision, para. 5. See also, Joshua, supra note 11, at 12–
13 (“[T]he Crown Prosecution Service, representing the U.S. government, seized on the
closing of this loophole to argue that the underlying hardcore cartel conduct alleged was
punishable in England—not as price fixing, but as common law conspiracy to defraud.”).
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other.”121 The 2003 Act applies to offenses that were committed both
before and after it came into force.122 Thus, because the Magistrates’
Court found that conspiracy to defraud and the American price fixing
charge met the dual criminality requirement, it deemed section 137(2)(b)
satisfied and considered Norris’s conduct an extradition offense.123
III. DISCUSSION
A. International Antitrust Enforcement
Antitrust enforcement was traditionally considered a domestic issue.124
Today, the global economy demands that antitrust law and policy adopt
an increasingly international perspective.125 As globalization of markets
and competition intensifies, anticompetitive practices by firms become
international in scope, as do their negative economic effects.126 However,
there is no international law of antitrust127 and several attempts at creating an international antitrust regime have failed.128 Furthermore, despite

121. See Jeremy Lever & John Pike, Cartel Agreements, Criminal Conspiracy and the
Statutory “Cartel Offense” (pt. 1), 26(2) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 90, 90.
122. See KNOWLES, supra note 25, at 21.
123. See Magistrates’ Court Decision, para. 8.
124. Lucio Lanucara, The Globalization of Antitrust Enforcement: Governance Issues
and Legal Responses, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 433, 435 (2001–02) (“Until the
1980s, antitrust enforcement was perceived as an almost exclusively domestic issue.”).
125. See MAHER M. DABBAH, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF ANTITRUST POLICY 13–
14 (Cambridge University Press, 2003); Eleanor M. Fox, Global Markets, National Law,
and the Regulation of Business: a View From the Top, 75 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 383, 384
(2001) [hereinafter Fox, Global Markets] (“Because of spill-overs, nationalism, and lack
of vision, national law may have a poor fit with transnational problems.”).
126. DABBAH, supra note 125, at 14; Fox, Global Markets, supra note 125, at 383
(“[M]arket problems that were once national are now of international dimension.”); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Hard Core Cartels, Recent
Progress and Challenges Ahead, 30 (2003), available with a subscription at
http://www1.oecd.org/publications/e-book/2403011E.PDF [hereinafter OECD Hard Core
Cartels] (“Globalisation and the internationalisation of markets have had a profound
effect on competition law enforcement.”).
127. See Joseph P. Griffin, Foreign Governmental Reactions to U.S. Assertions of
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 19(2) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 64, 64 (1998). Spencer
Weber Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 343,
344 (1997).
128. See Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 627, 632 (2001); Waller, supra note 127, 349 (“There have been five great attempts
to achieve a true international . . . competition law in the twentieth century. None has
been successful.”); see generally William Sugden, Global Antitrust and the Evolution of
an International Standard, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 989 (2002) (“Efforts to globalize
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the proliferation of competition law globally,129 legislation varies significantly by nation, and no single model applies across borders.130 Yet, international enforcement of antitrust remains at the forefront of discussion
in the antitrust legal community.131
There is generally global consensus on prohibiting hard core cartels
and agreement on the economic harm they cause.132 Nonetheless, criminal legislation against price fixing cartels is scarce across the world.133
Criminalization of cartel behavior is critical to effective international
antitrust enforcement.134 Moreover, as the number of cartels that operate
internationally increases, a global perspective is essential to successful
enforcement.135
Increased cooperation among worldwide antitrust authorities has led to
recent success in international antitrust enforcement for national authorities.136 Bilateral agreements are the most common form of antitrust cooperation.137 Additionally, the United States has successfully convinced

antitrust have a long history. Unfortunately, that history is marked more by failure than
success.”).
129. Over ninety countries, which account for almost eighty percent of world production, currently have competition laws in place. Diane P. Wood, International Harmonization of Antitrust Law: The Tortoise or the Hare?, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 391, 392 (2002).
130. JOELSON, supra note 12, at 6.
131. Scholars disagree about “the desirability and the feasibility of an international
competition law system.” See Waller, supra note 127, at 345. On one hand, skeptics
doubt the viability of an international antitrust code or even extensive harmonization of
international laws. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 129, at 405. On the other hand, others
advocate for an international antitrust regime and favor harmonization of competition
law. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, International Coordination of Competition Policy: Does
Global Antitrust Law Have a Future, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 911 (2003).
132. See Wood, supra note 129, at 395; Waller, supra note 127, at 404; OECD Hard
Core Cartels, supra note 126, at 8–9 (“[T]he total harm from cartels is significant indeed,
surely amounting to many billions of dollars [of affected commerce] each year.”).
133. Joshua, Tangled Web, supra note 114, at 2 n.1. (“To date, besides the US and
Canada—and now the U.K.—France, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Slovak Republic,
Norway, and South Korea have some type of criminal law enforcement [for hard core
cartels]. . . . Only a limited number of countries provide for sanctions of imprisonment . .
. .”); OECD Hard Core Cartels, supra note 126, at 29.
134. See Joshua, supra note 11, at 13.
135. See OECD Hard Core Cartels, supra note 126, at 30.
136. See Terry Calvani, Conflict, Cooperation, And Convergence in International
Competition, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1127, 1127 (“Cooperation is the order of the day.”);
Laurence K. Gustafson, Criminal Consequences of Anticompetitive Conduct, 45 S. TEX.
L. REV. 89, 90 (2003); Waller, supra note 127, at 360; OECD Hard Core Cartels, supra
note 126, at 30–31.
137. Waller, supra note 127, at 362.
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several governments to adopt enforcement policies similar to its own.138
International organizations like the International Competition Network
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(“OECD”) also assist coordination of global efforts and the sharing of
best practices between participating nations.139 Nonetheless, the recent
trend towards cooperation has been embraced by some countries more
enthusiastically than others.140
B. U.S. Cartel Policy and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
The United States has aggressively enforced antitrust law for over a
hundred years.141 In the United States, collusion among competitors is
viewed as the “supreme evil of antitrust.”142 Prosecuting cartels is a high
priority for the United States, particularly international price fixing cartels.143 In 2006, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice obtained fines of $473 million and brought criminal cases against sixty-nine
firms.144 In fact, the United States has created a specialized criminal enforcement team that focuses on hard core collusive activity.145 A
Sherman Act section 1 violation is a felony punishable by fines up to
138. “Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and the European Union have
adopted programs similar to the United States programs that encourage pleas and provide
leniency for cooperating corporations.” See Gustafson, supra note 136, at 95.
139. Id. at 95–96. The International Competition Network is an international body that
“by enhancing convergence and cooperation, . . . promotes more efficient, effective antitrust enforcement worldwide.” International Competition Network, http://www.internatio
nalcompetitionnetwork.org (last visited Oct. 27, 2007).
140. For example, the developing world supports primary commodity cartels and opposes any foreign efforts to extraterritorially apply antitrust laws to limit such cartels. See
SPENCER WEBER WALLER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD, § 4:2 (2006)
[hereinafter WALLER, ANTITRUST ABROAD]. But see Calvani, supra note 136, at 1130.
141. The Sherman Act was adopted in 1890. As amended, the Sherman Act is set forth
in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2004).
142. Verizon Communications, Inc v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398,
408 (2004). See also ANTITRUST DIVISION UPDATE, supra note 8 (discussing the Trinko
decision and noting that cartel enforcement is a high priority of the Antitrust Division).
143. Sheryl A. Brown, Antitrust Violations, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 217, 251 (Spring
2006) (“In 1994, the Clinton Administration simplified cooperation in antitrust enforcement between the United States and foreign nations by signing the International Antitrust
Enforcement Act. Consequently, aggressive international enforcement of criminal antitrust laws and the prosecution of international price-fixing cartels have become top priorities for the Antitrust Division.”).
144. Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Speech at the Fordham Competition Law Institute’s Annual Conference of International
Antitrust Law and Policy: Criminal Enforcement of Antitrust Laws: The U.S. Model, 1
(September 14, 2006).
145. Id. at 2.
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$100 million for corporations, and $1 million or up to ten years of imprisonment for individuals.146
The United States applied the Sherman Act extraterritorially as early as
1945. In United States v. Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa),147 the
Second Circuit, sitting for the Supreme Court,148 held a Canadian corporation liable for Sherman Act violations for conduct that occurred in
Canada but had consequences within the United States.149 The court acknowledged that imposition of liability upon non-citizens for conduct
that occurs abroad but violates local law was “settled law.”150 The Alcoa
effects doctrine, as it came to be known, dominated transnational antitrust jurisprudence for many years.151
Over time, the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law flourished.152
The ability of domestic plaintiffs to bring American antitrust claims
against foreign defendants,153 and foreign plaintiffs to bring American
146. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal.”). These penalties were increased by a 2004 Amendment
to the Sherman Act.
147. United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 416 (1945).
148. See 322 U.S. 716 (1944) (transferring the case to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals for want of a quorum of qualified justices on the Supreme Court of the United
States).
149. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443–44. Aluminum Limited was a Canadian corporation
that managed the Aluminum Company of America’s properties which were outside of the
United States. Id. at 439. The court found that Aluminum Limited’s cartel agreements
that fixed production quotas and later substituted the quota system for a system of royalties were violative of the Sherman Act. Id. at 442–43. See also Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 (1986) (refusing recovery under the
Sherman Act for an alleged cartel in the Japanese market, because “American antitrust
laws do not regulate the competitive conditions of other nations’ economies”).
150. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443 (stating that “any state may impose liabilities, even
upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other states
will ordinarily recognize”). This approach is known as “objective territoriality,” a subset
of territorial jurisdiction, one of the five generally accepted bases of international jurisdiction. The other four bases of international jurisdiction are nationality, passive personality, protective principle, and universality. See Ellen S. Podgor, “Defensive Territoriality”: A New Paradigm for the Prosecution of Extraterritorial Business Crimes, 31 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 9–10 (2002).
151. See JOELSON, supra note 12, at 49.
152. For a succinct summary of the evolution of extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust laws, see S. Lynn Diamond, Note, Empagran, the FTAIA and Extraterritorial
Effects: Guidance to Courts Facing Questions of Antitrust Jurisdiction Still Lacking, 31
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 805, 811–15 (2006).
153. In Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. California, the Supreme Court held that
application of the Sherman Act against a London reinsurance broker that engaged in con-

2007]

EXTRADITION FOR ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

229

antitrust claims against domestic defendants,154 was only limited by the
principle of international comity155 and the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act.156 When presented the opportunity to extend U.S. jurisdiction even further and allow foreign plaintiffs to litigate in the United
States against foreign defendants for an injury suffered abroad, the Supreme Court, in F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S.A., declined
to do so.157
Still, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice exercises
jurisdiction to the extent the law will allow.158 Moreover, a United States
decision to prosecute an antitrust action reflects an Executive Branch
determination that the “importance of antitrust enforcement outweighs
any relevant policy concerns.”159 As such, the Department of Justice
states, courts should not engage in a comity analysis as to “second-guess
the executive branch’s judgment.”160
When determining whether to assert jurisdiction in an antitrust action,
the Antitrust Division accounts for international comity.161 In its analysis,
the Antitrust Division will consider factors such as the “relative significance of the alleged violation within the United States as compared to
conduct abroad,” “the nationality of the persons involved,” “the degree
of conflict with foreign law or . . . economic policies,” and the “effec-

spiracies to affect the U.S. insurance market was proper. The court rejected the London
reinsurer’s argument that jurisdiction was contrary to the principle of international comity, finding that “the London reinsurers’ express purpose to affect United States commerce and the substantial nature of the effect produced, outweighed the supposed conflict
that required the exercise of jurisdiction in this litigation.” See 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).
154. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov’t of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
155. See U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations (1995) § 3.2 [hereinafter Guidelines
for International Operations], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/inte
rnat.htm.
156. See F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 158 (2004)
(“The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA) excludes from the
Sherman Act’s reach much anticompetitive conduct that causes only foreign injury.”).
157. Id. at 175.
158. See Guidelines for International Operations, supra note 155, § 3.1.
159. Id. § 3.2.
160. Id. This position has been criticized as a “broad assertion of power” that fails to
“cite . . . precedent for applying one jurisdictional standard to government prosecutions
and another to private suits,” fails to note that “Congress is given responsibility under the
Constitution for regulating commerce with foreign nations,” and disregards the fact that a
“court must construe the application of the antitrust laws to foreign commerce as Congress, not the executive branch, deems appropriate.” Joseph P. Griffin, Extraterritoriality
in U.S. and EU Antitrust Enforcement, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 159, 189–90 (1999).
161. See Guidelines for International Operations, supra note 155, § 3.2.
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tiveness of foreign enforcement as compared to U.S. action.”162 The decision about whether to pursue a case is nonetheless highly discretionary,
and ultimately if a foreign country’s antitrust regime does not align with
U.S. policies, the factors outlined for consideration by the Antitrust Division weigh in favor of exercising jurisdiction.163
C. U.K. Cartel Policy and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
U.K. competition law aims to correct distortions to the competitive
process within the United Kingdom.164 In contrast with the United States,
where private enforcement of antitrust laws is common, the United
Kingdom only recently recognized a private right of action for violations
of U.K. competition law.165 Another significant difference between U.K.
and U.S. cartel law is liability of corporations.166 The U.K. Enterprise
Act cartel offense does not provide for corporate criminal liability,
whereas in the United States corporations may be held liable for any antitrust violation.167 In addition, as a member of the European Community
(“EC”), the United Kingdom must enforce its competition policy within
that of the EC, which itself has an active competition regime.168
The United Kingdom also views cartels as criminal, but not until relatively recently with the enactment of the Enterprise Act 2002 (“2002
Act”). Deterrence was the main objective of introducing a criminal offense for cartel participation with the 2002 Act.169 Creation of the crimi-

162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See Enterprise Bill, Bill [115], Research Paper 02/21, Apr. 4, 2002, 16.
165. See Barry Rodger, Competition Law Litigation in the U.K. Courts: A Study of All
Cases to 2004, 27(5) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 241 (2006).
166. Compare Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40. § 188 (“An individual is guilty of an offence if he dishonestly agrees . . .”) and Joshua, Tangled Web, supra note 114, 623 (stating that “[t]he offence can be committed only by an individual, not a company”), with
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (“The word ‘person’ or ‘persons,’ wherever used in sections
1 to 7 of this title shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under
or authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories,
the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country.”).
167. See Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40. § 188; 15 U.S.C. § 7.
168. See FURSE & NASH, supra note 116, at 6.
169. See MacCulloch, supra note 114, at 616. Deterrence is a common aim of including criminal sanctions in cartel legislation, and one that is recommended by the OECD.
See OECD Hard Core Cartels, supra note 126, at 27, 30; Patricia Hanh Rosochowicz,
The Appropriateness of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcement of Competition Law, 25(12)
EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 752, 753 (2004).
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nal cartel offense was a controversial element of the 2002 Act.170 Some
regard it as “one of the most significant developments in U.K. criminal
justice policy in the last decade.”171 Indeed, it may demonstrate that the
United Kingdom’s perspective on competition is converging with that of
the United States, which is perhaps why the British government is willing to proceed with Norris’s extradition today.172
Although the United Kingdom has taken steps towards aligning its
competition policy with that of the United States, there are differences
which may prove significant.173 Specifically, the U.K. cartel offense incorporates a “dishonesty” requirement.174 The drafters of the 2002 Act
argue that the dishonesty requirement communicates the seriousness of
the offense, but some critics maintain that because the term “dishonesty”
is undefined,175 it will lead to great difficulty in successfully convicting
offenders.176 This element of the cartel offense contrasts greatly with the
U.S. Sherman Act, which is based on conspiracy, and likely will lead to
greatly varied enforcement.177
Historically, the United Kingdom was hostile to extraterritorial enforcement of American antitrust law.178 In the 1960s and 1970s, the
United Kingdom enacted retaliatory legislation known as “blocking statutes” in an effort to curb extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. antitrust law
by American courts.179 When the United States exercised jurisdiction
170. See Enterprise Bill, Bill [115], Research Paper 02/21, Apr. 4, 2002, 53, available
at http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2002/rp02-021.pdf. See e.g., MacCulloch, supra note 114, at 616.
171. Joshua, Tangled Web, supra note 114, at 620; see MacCulloch, supra note 114, at
616.
172. See Joshua, supra note 11, at 13 (“Ironically, it was not the U.K.’s criminalization
of cartels as such but rather the change in official perceptions that led the US to request
Mr. Norris’s extradition.”); MacCulloch, supra note 114, at 616 (“The Cartel Offence
reflects a move within the U.K. regime towards a dual alignment adapting . . . elements
from the US antitrust regime . . . .”).
173. See Joshua, Tangled Web, supra note 114, at 625.
174. Id. at 624–25. See also Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40. § 188 (“An individual is guilty
of an offence if he dishonestly agrees with one or more other persons to make or implement, or to cause to be made or implemented, arrangements of the following kind relating
to at least two undertakings (A and B).”).
175. “The definition of ‘dishonesty’ under English law largely stems from cases under
the Theft Act 1968. Dishonesty is a matter of fact, not law, for the jury to decide in light
of the particular circumstances of the case.” MacCulloch, supra note 114, at 621.
176. See Joshua, Tangled Web, supra note 114, at 626.
177. Id. at 625.
178. See MacCulloch, supra note 114, at 623.
179. See Anthony J. Carroll, The Extraterritorial Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Laws
and Retaliatory Legislation in the United Kingdom and Australia, 13 DENV. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 377, 377 (1984) (discussing the British Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980
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over British citizens whose anticompetitive acts took place in the United
Kingdom, the United Kingdom objected and refused to compel its citizens to cooperate with American pre-trial discovery.180 Conflict ensued
for many years because competition policy was considered an American
ideal.181
The United Kingdom’s approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction in the
context of antitrust, particularly the effects doctrine, is markedly different from that of the United States.182 The United Kingdom has generally
opposed the effects doctrine.183 The United Kingdom expressed the view
that jurisdiction may only be exercised in antitrust matters over foreign
corporations on the basis of either the territorial principle or the nationality principle,184 and even then it should be narrowly applied.185 Specifically, with regard to the territorial principle, the United Kingdom stated
that extraterritorial jurisdiction was justified only if conduct of the foreign national or foreign corporation took place within the state claiming
jurisdiction.186
D. Extradition for Antitrust Offenders
According to U.S. law, the United States may unquestionably exercise
jurisdiction over Norris for his participation in a cartel that impacted
American commerce.187 But, is it prudent for the United States to inter-

and its retaliatory nature in response to United States prosecution of a uranium cartel);
see also Lanucara, supra note 124, at 436 (“[T]he extraterritorial exercise of sovereignty
by U.S. authorities, sanctioned by U.S. courts, was met by resistance from European
partners, especially France and the United Kingdom.”).
180. See, e.g., Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., [1978] A.C. 547
(H.L.) (addressing an American request for oral examination and production of documents from U.K. citizens in relation to the existence of an international uranium cartel).
181. Calvani, supra note 136, at 1130.
182. See Tapio Puurunen, The Legislative Jurisdiction of States Over Transactions in
International Electronic Commerce, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 689, 720
(2000) (illustrating British and American interpretations of the objective territorial principle with the effects doctrine).
183. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 315 (5th ed.
1998).
184. See supra note 149.
185. See Statement of Principles According to Which, in the View of the United Kingdom Government, Jurisdiction May Be Exercised Over Foreign Corporations in AntiTrust Matters, reprinted in BROWNLIE, supra note 183, at 316–17.
186. Id. at 316–17.
187. See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus., 109 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997) (reversing
dismissal of a Sherman Act suit against a Japanese corporation where the price fixing
activities took place entirely in Japan); Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 796 (“[I]t is well estab-
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vene in the conduct of insulated foreign parties?188 Domestic regulators
and prosecutors have the discretion to exercise such jurisdiction,189 which
undoubtedly implicates foreign policy and may have economic ramifications. Moreover, using extradition to prosecute foreign nationals for U.S.
antitrust violations may result in improper application of the law by
courts eager to further their national competition polity. As seen in Norris, this may result in an unjust retroactive application of recently implemented competition policy.
The argument in favor of enforcing U.S. antitrust laws on foreign parties is based on the assumption that all parties that participate in U.S.
markets, both domestic and foreign, benefit from the transparency of the
U.S. market and openness of market information.190 Furthermore, the
United States has an interest in preserving market order.191 By enforcing
its antitrust laws against hard core international cartels, the United States
is arguably addressing a problem that concerns the international community as a whole.192 Still, there exists a tension between the benefits to be
gained by global enforcement and jurisdictional norms within the international community.193
One approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction over business crimes, including antitrust violations, is “defensive territoriality.”194 The theory of
defensive territoriality argues that the United States should exercise jurisdiction over business crimes on a limited basis, and should take a defensive approach. By this theory, the United States should only prosecute
when it is necessary for protection, when a U.S. administrative agency
controls the business entity, or when the business entity acted outside the
United States to intentionally evade U.S. jurisdiction.195 The rationale
behind this principle is that prosecution of certain crimes is subject to the
“whims of prosecutors” and political agendas, and extraterritorial prosecution is potentially limitless in the era of globalization.196 Additionally,
lished by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce
and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States.”).
188. See S.W. O’Donnell, Antitrust Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over State Owned
Enterprises and the End of Prudential Prophylactic Judicial Doctrines, 26 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 247, 261 (2003).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 259.
191. Id.
192. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT’L L.
251, 271 (2006).
193. Id. at 255.
194. See generally Podgor, supra note 150.
195. Id. at 28.
196. Id. at 24.
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defensive territoriality argues that the uniqueness of business crimes, as
distinct from other transnational crimes like terrorism, calls for limited
application of U.S. law extraterritorially.197 That is, because business
crimes can be related to a legitimate entity, globalization has impacted
business, and business crimes have both a criminal and civil dimension,
the United States should limit extraterritorial prosecution of them.198
On the other hand, one may argue that it is efficient for the United
States, with a developed body of antitrust law and powerful remedies, to
reach as far as the law may allow in order to stop anticompetitive practices that harm the global economy. This argument may be persuasive in
the context of cartels, where the general consensus is that cartels should
be eliminated. However, this position fails for several reasons. First, although many nations have competition laws, their attitude and policies
about the aims of such legislation differ.199 Even when a foreign jurisdiction has a viable antitrust regime, enforcement techniques may differ
substantially.200 Second, many countries resent imposition of American
economic policies and laws, and oppose aggressive enforcement against
their citizens or businesses.201 And finally, there may be economic implications such as hostility towards American business.202 This rationale for
limited exercise of U.S. antitrust jurisdiction, despite potential efficiency,
weighs in favor of limited pursuit of extradition for antitrust violations.
CONCLUSION
In Norris, the Court properly held it was not a matter for the judiciary
to determine whether the United States should be removed as a designated territory under the Extradition 2003. However, the Court should
have decided that the dual criminality requirement was not met without
awaiting determination of the Bermingham decision. When Norris allegedly engaged in the price fixing agreements, cartel participation was not
a crime in the United Kingdom. The Court erred by allowing common
law conspiracy to defraud to serve as the comparable U.K. offense.
Moreover, the common law conspiracy to defraud has never been suc197. Id. at 15–16.
198. Id. at 16–18.
199. WALLER, ANTITRUST ABROAD, supra note 140, § 4:1.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.; see also O’Shea, supra note 53 (“[A]ttempting to manage a company in accordance with a less predictable legal environment will be costly for business in the short
term and is likely to lead to increasing risk-aversion. It would be bizarre if a side-effect of
internationalized law enforcement was a more defensive approach to overseas investment
and a retreat from wider markets by U.K. businesses.”).
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cessfully prosecuted in the United Kingdom where the underlying conduct was cartel participation.203
Although the U.S. Department of Justice may be enthusiastic about the
potential to use extradition to reach antitrust violators,204 the United
States should pursue extradition of foreign antitrust offenders only on a
limited basis. The Norris case illustrates the potential consequences of
the United States flexing its antitrust muscle in the United Kingdom. In
light of the negative public reaction in the United Kingdom to the Norris
extradition, there is a risk of history repeating itself with blocking legislation or other protective measures. Those consequences may amplify if
the same efforts are directed towards a less friendly nation.
Extradition of antitrust offenders allows the United States to expand
the global reach of its antitrust policy. It implicates significant foreign
policy considerations and may also frustrate effective global antitrust
enforcement.205 Further, there may be economic ramifications if foreign
enterprises view the United States as a risky place to transact their business because of increased exposure to criminal antitrust prosecution. In
sum, the United States should approach use of extradition to prosecute
antitrust violations with caution and exercise limited discretion in determining when to pursue extradition as an avenue for enforcement.
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203. See Osgood, supra note 16, at 38; Husnara Begum, BA Cartel Probe sees OFT
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